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This paper presents an overview an different approaches to secure web 
applications that are written in JavaScript. It also discusses 
opportunies for using aspect-oriented concepts in this domain. 
 
Pros and Cons 
************* 
 
The paper is a well-structured overview on approaches to secure 
JavaScript applications. Unfortunately, this is not my domain of 
expertise. Therefore, I can hardly tell whether the numerous cited 
papers are presented correctly. 
 
The discussion on how aspects could be improve the existing approaches 
is quite vague. No concrete examples are given. 
 
Typical phrases throughout the paper are "Aspects can be used to ..." 
and "Aspects are also well-suited to ...". This might be true, but, 
anyway, it is not evident what problem we have this existing (not 
aspect-based) approaches. A solid problem discuss would improve the 
readers motivation a lot. 
 
The authors claim that due to their structured domain analysis, they 
found new applications areas for aspects. Therefore, it would be worth 





page 3: "that a access" -> "that access" 
 
page 4: "the a system" -> "the system" 
 
"Discussion": "our study ... has show taht aspects are generally 
useful ..." -> I would phrase that more carefully. 
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----------- REVIEW ----------- 
Summary: 
The paper is about using AOP for securing JavaScript (JS) 
applications. Three security areas are examined: fine-grained access 
control, capabilities-based security, and information flow. The first 
area is already tackled by aspects, and the existing AO approaches are 
surveyed. For the two other areas, AO solutions are proposed. 
 
Evaluation: 
The subject of the paper is interesting and and it opens new 
directions for AOP. However my main concern is that the actual AOP 
solutions that are proposed are too general. The recommendation is to 
accept the paper after revising the proposed solutions, adding more 
details and code examples. 
 
Detailed: 
- The connection between JS and AOP is very interesting. I would like to 
here more on existing AOP extensions for JS. How developed is the field? 
- It is stated that "We provide evidence that aspects are useful...", 
what kind of such evidence is provided? 
- "Our primary goal is the expression of security policies for web 
application using aspect-oriented programming". The paper should be 
revised so that more is said about the AOP policies themselves. 
- There is not even a single code snippet showing how AOP make JS more 
secure. It is particularly interesting since usually the code examples 
are from Java and AspectJ. 
- Section 2: Fine-grained access control 
  - Which are the AOP technologies that ConScript and WebJail are based 
on? 
  - It is mentioned that ZAC is based on AspectScript "a library that 
rewrites JavaScript code", what does it mean to rewrite JS code?. 
- Section 3: Capabilities-based security 
  - The nature of the capabilities mechanism is not clear from the intro 
of section 3. E.g., what does "isolation properties" mean? 
  - It is explained how aspects may turn JS into a capability-safe 
language and the explanation is very lacking: it should be more detailed 
including some code examples. 
  - It is mentioned that aspects are "well-suited to support security 
properties that are defined based on capabilities". Also here, the 
point is not clear and should be better clarified. To conclude, this 
section should be improved to (1) better explain the concept of 
capabilities, what does it mean for a language to be capability-safe? 
(2) explain in more detail how aspects can make JS a capability-safe 
language, what does it mean "to support security properties that are 
defined based on capabilities", and how aspects may help with that. 
- Section 4: Information Flow 
  - The introduction of section 4 has too many new terms, which are 
difficult to grasp for someone who is not familiar with this area. Some 
concrete examples are needed. 
 
- A typo: "Capabilities are a language-level mechanism that cannot be 
forged and directly serve as a proxy and mediate any access to resources" 
=> add s to serve and to mediate. 
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----------- REVIEW ----------- 
This work presents a review of major techniques for securing 
JavaScript applications. The author discuss the limitations of some 
existing approaches take advantage of AOP, and show how other 
approaches may benefit from using AOP. The conclusions of this work 
are that no single approach is sufficient, but rather that a portfolio 
of techniques need to be considered, and aspects are a good candidate 
to be considered as a technique within of any comprehensive strategy 
for secure software systems. 
 
The paper is well organized and well motivated, and the background 
support is suitably chosen and helps drive the argument. The scope of 
the work fits well within the goals of the MISS workshop and I believe 
that the review presented within will be of interest to the majority 
of workshop attendees. 
 
Minor issue: 
p.3, col.1, par.2: "a access" --> "access" 
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----------- REVIEW ----------- 
The paper discusses how AOP can be used to address security concerns in 
Javascript.  For different categories of well-know security concerns, 
that 
they start by describing, they discuss how AOP could be used.  They also 
discuss previous work in the area and their limitations. 
 
In general, the paper is well written and it is easy to follow, even for 
readers that are not experts in the area of Javascript security, as some 
background is provided in the paper (considering the size limits, it 
seems the 
right amount of background). 
The topic is also interesting, and pertinent, due to the proliferation of 
web applications that make extensive use of Javascript. 
 
In the Discussion section, you briefly enumerate the characteristics of 
the 
framework you envision.  My main criticism to the paper is that few 
details 
are provided there.  I understand that this is a position paper, but I 
would 
expect some prototype implementation, or something else that allowed me 
to 
have a better idea of the challenges that implementing the solution will 
raise.  I also think that describing the framework/language you expect to 
implement at the beginning, and during the description of the different 
categories of security concerns explain how your framework would be 
helpful, 
would make the paper better. 
 
Two of the challenges expected are discussed. 
Regarding performance, I think that currently is widely accepted that 
portability is essential in web applications, therefore browser specific 
solutions does not seem to be an acceptable option. 
 
However, I believe the main problem of using aspects will be to make 
easy to predict the effects of the aspects (that you also address in 
the last paragraph of Discussion). 
From my experience with AOP, we often get unintended results from 
aspects, 
and good tool support to allow us to visualize the results of weaving the 
aspects is essential.  Do you think that, given the dynamic nature of 
Javascript, it will be possible to provide good tool support for AOP? 
Moreover, we would be creating aspects that affect external libraries we 
usually do not know in detail. 
I suspect this point is critical to allow a wide acceptance of aspects 
for 
Javascript/security, and to make them more than just a proof of concept, 
therefore some additional discussion on the topic would be useful. 
 
Despite my previous observations, I agree that it is worth to study the 
use of 
AOP as a general approach to secure Javascript, and I think this paper 
provides 
a good analysis of this topic. 
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----------- REVIEW ----------- 
The authors present a study about the implementation of 
security policies with aspect-oriented programming in JavaScript 
applications. Hereby, they discuss the topics "fine-grained access 
control", "capability-secure scripting" and "dynamic information 
flow". The paper concludes that AOP was well-suited for all three 
topics. 
 
The paper is well-structured. Each of the three topics in discussed in a 
separate section, and in each section, the general introduction is 
followed by AOP-specifics. 
 
Unfortunately, the paper gets often imprecise and sloppy. To name a few 
examples: "applications" do not have "cousins". AOP does not get 
"implanted". What are the "complex semantic rules regarding 'this'" 
exactly, and how are they relevant to AOP? Important examples, such as 
"the same-origin policy" and "Content Security Policy" lack proper 
references in the bibliography. 
 
The kind of "fine-grained access control" that the authors envision 
remains unclear. In the beginning of the section, the authors state that 
a single policy may not be enough to adequately secure an 
application. Unfortunately, this point is not addressed in the following 
presentation. Instead, two approaches that target the browser and the 
application itself are provided, but the authors should really be more 
precise how AOP can help applications to provide better access 
control. In no case, the paper discusses what kind of thread models are 
considered. A concrete example would probably help a lot. 
 
The section about capability-based systems is very confusing. The very 
terse introduction (without references) is complemented with a weak 
example. A reader without specific knowledge about the design principles 
of capability-based systems is unlikely to follow the rest of the 
section. What follows is a very general discussion about implementing 
capabilities in Java, with the conclusion that JavaScript is a very 
problematic language for this goal. The authors suggest to overcome the 
limitations (which are only vaguely specified) with "aspects". The 
discussion remains very abstract, again, a concrete example would help a 
lot. 
 
Section 4 starts with a discussion in what way static analysis is 
superior to dynamic analysis for ensuring information flow 
properties. The section continues with presenting existing approaches 
that implement both variants. The authors claim that aspects would be 
"well-suited" to implement dynamic analyses. Unfortunately, they this 
claim is not backed up at all: Section 4.2, paragraph 1 discusses the 
premises that must hold for the claim, but the claim itself remains 
unclear. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of this section also contain unbacked 
personal opinions of the authors that does not fit an objective survey. 
 
The paper is something between a survey of AOP techniques to implement 
security policies, and a position paper. Unfortunately, the position of 
the authors is unconvincing, despite its repetition in various ways. The 
survey would be interesting to read if there were some noteworthy 
finding. 
 
The abstract as well as the conclusion section of the paper are not 
really helpful to summarize the (sparse) findings and conclusions drawn 
from the paper. 
 
